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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Woodrow Grant appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the district court failed to apply the 
proper standards when denying him the assistance of post-conviction counsel and 
summarily dismissing his petition. He contends further that he made sufficient 
allegations of fact in his verified pleadings to merit both assistance of counsel and an 
evidentiary hearing on his claims. Based on either argument, he requests this Court 
vacate the district court's orders and remand the case for further proceedings with the 
instruction that he be appointed post-conviction counsel and afforded an evidentiary 
hearing as part of those further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Grant was incarcerated on three different charges in three separate cases 
(aggravated battery, possession of methamphetamine, and domestic assault). 
(R., pp.1-2.) He timely petitioned for post-conviction relief in those cases. 1 He alleged 
that his attorney had been deficient in multiple aspects of his representation at the trial 
level. (R., pp.2-4.) Mr. Grant set forth the facts supporting his allegations in his petition, 
as well as an attached affidavit in support. (R., pp.2-7.) In addition, he filed a motion 
and affidavit in support of appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.9-11.) Both 
of these documents were verified by a notary public. (R., p.7.) The record does not 
1 In regard to the aggravated battery charge, Mr. Grant had originally been placed on 
probation following a successful period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.1.) That probation 
was subsequently revoked. (R., p.1.) Therefore, in regard to that case, his petition for 
post-conviction relief is only timely from the order revoking probation. 
1 
indicate that the State ever filed an answer or motion for summary dismissal.2 (See 
generally R.; see also Register of Actions (RoAs)i 
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the post-conviction petition. 
(R., pp.23-49.) In that notice, it also denied Mr. Grant's request for the assistance of 
post-conviction counsel because, it asserted, he did not allege facts raising the 
possibility of a valid claim. (R., p.27.) It then articulated its reasons for dismissing his 
various claims. (R., pp.28-49.) The most prevalent of its rationales was that Mr. Grant 
had not presented any evidence other than his own allegations, which the district court 
described as conclusory, unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.31, 37, 38, 39,41, 
43, 44, 46, 47, 48.) It also reasoned that Mr. Grant had not proven his allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or adequate facts to 
state a claim for relief.4 (R., pp.37, 39, 40, 41, 48.) Along those same lines, the district 
court indicated that Mr. Grant needed to present facts which demonstrated the outcome 
of his case would be different in order to survive summary dismissal. (R., pp.46-47.) 
Mr. Grant filed a motion to amend the petition and a response to the district 
court's notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.50-60.) As before, his assertions were 
verified by a notary public. (R., p.60.) He alleged additional, more-specific facts that 
supported his various claims. (R., pp.52-60.) Those clarifications revealed that 
Mr. Grant was making two overarching arguments. First, he contended that his trial 
attorney had provided deficient and prejudicial performance in several ways: by not 
2 The State did file a motion to extend the time for filing an answer, which the district 
court granted. (R., pp.19-22.) 
3 The RoAs appear before the first numbered page in the Clerk's Record. 
4 As a result of this perspective, the district court apparently did not regard the facts 
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings and affidavit as evidence that it could 
consider, or, at least, did not accept the factual allegations as true. (See generally, 
R., pp.23-49.) 
2 
moving for a change of venue or the district court judge's recusal; not presenting 
mitigating evidence concerning the impact of his mental condition or testimony 
regarding the improper investigation of the underlying cases; not informing him of his 
rights, as articulated in Estrada5 ; and, not allowing him an opportunity to review the 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) or assisting him to object to 
improperly-included information therein. (R., pp.52-59.) 
Second, as to the two cases in which his petition was timely from the judgments, 
Mr. Grant contended that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently enter his guilty 
pleas because of his attorney's improper assurances that he would receive concurrent 
sentences and the opportunity to participate in the rider program; and, because he was 
incompetent at the time he entered the plea due to a severe depressive episode caused 
by his bi-polar disorder. (R., pp.56-58.) Along with his response to the notice of intent 
to dismiss, Mr. Grant also renewed his request for appointment of post-conviction 
counsel. (R., p.59.) As part of that request he asserted that, in addition to the facts he 
had already alleged to be true, there was evidence he was unable to collect or present 
to the district court due to his incarceration, but which he claimed would provide 
additional support for his allegations. (See R., p.59.) 
Nevertheless, the district court dismissed Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction 
relief. It asserted that Mr. Grant's response to the notice of intent to Dismiss "did not 
include any additional documents or affidavits." (R., p.86.) Again, as it went through 
Mr. Grant's specific allegations, the district court reasoned that he had not presented 
any evidence other than his own allegations, which it still considered to be conclusory, 
unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.86, 90, 92,95,96,98,100,101,102,103, 
5 Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006). 
3 
104, 105, 106.) It also continued to assert that Mr. Grant had not proven his allegations 
by a preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or adequate facts 
to state a claim for relief. (R., pp.98, 100, 104.) Additionally, it continued to assert that 
Mr. Grant needed to present facts which demonstrated "the outcome of his case would 
have been different" in order to survive summary dismissal. (R., p.106; see also 
R., pp.95, 96.) It also denied Mr. Grant's renewed motion for post-conviction counsel 
for the same reason it had before. (R., p.90.) 
Mr. Grant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing 
his petition pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and 60(b). (R., pp.65-85l Again, the document 
was verified by a notary public. (R., p.85.) In that motion, Mr. Grant alleged additional 
facts which supported several of his claims. (See R., pp.69-84.) Three months later, 
the district court determined that Mr. Grant had simply reiterated his prior allegations 
and that he did not argue that the district court had made any errors of law or fact in its 
initial decision, and so, it denied that motion. (R., p.115.) Mr. Grant filed a notice of 
appeal which is timely as to all the district court's decisions.7 
6 This document appears in the record out of chronological order. It was file-stamped 
May 27, 2011. (R., p.65.) The district court's order dismissing the petition for post-
conviction relief, which appears subsequently in the record, was file-stamped on 
May 11,2011. (R., p.86.) 
7 The final judgment dismissing Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief conforming 
with the requirements from the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure was entered on 
June 13,2013, in response to the Idaho Supreme Court's order on that same date. 
I.A.R. 17(e)(2) allows that a notice of appeal filed prior to the entry of an appealable 
order will become valid upon the filing of the appealable judgment. Weller v. State, 146 
Idaho 652, 653-54 (Ct. App. 2008). Therefore, Mr. Grant's appeal is timely from the 
final judgment. 
Additionally, Mr. Grant's notice of appeal is timely from the order denying his 
motion to reconsider filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) because the time to appeal begins 




1. Whether the district court erred when it declined to appoint counsel in Mr. Grant's 
post-conviction action, even though he had made the necessary showing to merit 
appointment of counsel. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Grant's petition 
for post-conviction relief without properly considering the undisputed factual 




The District Court Erred When It Declined To Appoint Counsel In Mr. Grant's Post-
Conviction Action, Even Though He Had Made The Necessary Showing To Merit 
Appointment Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Mr, Grant made the necessary showing to require appointment of counsel as he 
alleged facts supporting some of the elements of his claims for relief. As such, the 
district court should have appointed counsel to assist him in making a full and complete 
presentation of evidence to the district court in support of those claims. In light of a 
recent decision by the United States Supreme Court, this failure to appoint counsel 
when merited violated Mr. Grant's constitutional right to due process since the post-
conviction action was Mr. Grant's first opportunity to present these issues, particularly 
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The question of whether there is such a 
due process right has yet to be decided by the United States Supreme Court, and the 
Idaho precedent to the contrary should be reexamined in light of the new United States 
Supreme Court precedent. 8 
However, even if no such right is recognized, Mr. Grant still has an Idaho 
statutory right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings since he alleged facts that 
could possibly give rise to a valid claim for relief. Therefore, under either rationale, the 
district court erroneously denied Mr. Grant's numerous requests for the assistance of 
post-conviction counsel. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court's order 
denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the order summarily 
8 E.g., Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 724 (1998) (,'There is no statutory or legal right 
to an attorney in post-conviction proceedings in Idaho.") (citing Banks v. State, 128 
Idaho 886, 889 (1996) and Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902 (Ct. App. 1995». 
6 
dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings with the 
assistance of counsel. 
B. Mr. Grant Had A Due Process Right To An Attorney In The Initial Post-Conviction 
Proceedings Under The State And Federal Constitutions 
As part of its promise of due process, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
right to counsel in certain situations.9 U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see, e.g., 
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 195 (1957) ("Where the right to counsel is of such 
critical importance as to be an element of Due Process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a finding of waiver is not lightly to be made."); In Interest of Kinley, 108 
Idaho 862, 866 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The right to counsel is so basic to our notions of fair 
trial and due process that denial of the right is never treated as harmless error."); 
Pierce v. State, 2004 Unpublished Opinion No. 24, 1 (Ct. App. March 25, 2004) 
(recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment protections include a guarantee of 
counsel, noting that the Idaho Supreme Court has yet to decide whether that right 
extends to "discretionary review after an appeal"); 10 see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 
387, 401 (1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant 
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the 
9 The Idaho Constitution should also afford this right as part of the due process rights 
afforded by Art. /, § 13, as the two clauses are substantially the same. Compare 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV with IDAHO CONST. art I, § 13. Although Idaho reserves the 
right to interpret its constitution as more protective than its federal counterpart, it will 
consider the federal jurisprudence when interpreting the provisions thereof. 
Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577 (1996); State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 190 
~2000). 
o As an unpublished opinion, Pierce has no authoritative or precedential value. Internal 
Rules of the Idaho Supreme Court, Rule 15(f). It is cited merely as an example of the 
analysis the Court of Appeals has used when reviewing the Fourteenth Amendment's 
due process right to counsel in regard to discretionary review after direct appeal, such 
as post-conviction petitions in Idaho. 
7 
Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."); 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[Flailing to provide a post-
conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented 
may be violative of due process."). 
The "initial-review collateral proceeding" (in post-conviction cases, the initial 
petition heard by the district court) is one such proceeding where deprivation of the 
assistance of counsel constitutes a deprivation of due process, See Martinez v. Ryan, 
132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) ("[T]he Constitution may require the States to provide 
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings because 'in [these] cases ... state 
collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction."') 
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991)). This is because the initial-
review collateral proceeding serves as the applicant's only chance to challenge the 
effectiveness of his attorney.11 Id. As a result of this aspect of the initial-review 
11 The States have been permitted to establish their own systems in regard to direct 
appeals and collateral attacks. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19. Idaho has chosen 
to separate the collateral attack from the direct appeal because the direct appeal record 
may not contain sufficient evidence to effectively resolve the collateral claims. See, 
e.g., State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 
437, 443 (2008). Idaho's system requires that an applicant, who is seeking to challenge 
his sentence with evidence not in the direct appeal record (i.e., to support an ineffective 
assistance claim), should make that claim in post-conviction because "[ilf an appellate 
court were to reach the merits of ineffective assistance issues raised on direct appeal, 
the absence of any record supporting the claims would generally require a decision 
adverse to the appellant, which would be res judicata." Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549; 
accord Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443. 
The United States Supreme Court explained that such a system is not only 
permissible, but is based on sound reasoning. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. But the 
Supreme Court also pointed out that such a system has consequences for the state 
implementing it. Id. For instance, employing such a system reduces the State's ability 
to foreclose claims through procedural bars. See id. As such, the Coleman Court's 
rationale, that the Constitution may require the States to provide counsel in certain 
collateral attacks to a conviction, would apply to not only the initial proceedings on the 
direct appeal, but the initial-review collateral proceeding created in Idaho's post-
conviction system as well. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315,1317. 
8 
collateral proceeding, those proceedings may constitute an exception from the holdings 
in Finley v. Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 
(1989), which, according to the Court in Coleman, established a general rule that there 
is no right to counsel in such collateral proceedings. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. The 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that this question remains unresolved: 
[Coleman] left open, and the Court of Appeals in this case addressed, a 
question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective 
counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise 
a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. ... Coleman had suggested, 
though without holding, that the Constitution may require States to provide 
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings because "in [these] 
cases, ... state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a 
challenge to his conviction." As Coleman noted, this makes the initial-
review collateral proceeding a prisoner's "one and only appeal" as to an 
ineffective-assistance claim, and this may justify an exception to the 
constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral 
proceedings. This is not the case, however, to resolve whether that 
exception exists as a constitutional matter. 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755). 
The reason the United States Supreme Court did not completely resolve that 
question is simple: that particular question was not presented on appeal. Martinez, 
132 S. Ct. at 1315. Rather, the question before the Court in that case was whether 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding may provide cause for 
a procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding. Id. In that case, the Ninth Circuit 
had determined that the applicant did not have a right to counsel in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding, and thus, his initial post-conviction attorney's failure to raise 
the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel did not prevent a procedural default of 
the habeas proceedings because that claim had not been raised in the initial post-
conviction proceeding. Id. at 1313-15. The United States Supreme Court reversed that 
decision and remanded for a determination on the substantive issues raised: whether 
9 
Mr. Martinez's initial-review collateral proceeding counsel had been ineffective and 
whether his underlying claim (ineffective assistance of trial counsel) was substantial. Id. 
at 1320-21. 
The Supreme Court explained that during such a "first-tier" proceeding, pro se 
petitioners "'are generally ill equipped to represent themselves because they do not 
have a brief from counselor an opinion of the court addressing their claim of error.'" Id. 
at 1317 (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)). The Supreme Court 
pointed out that "[w]here . . . the initial-review collateral proceeding is the first 
designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, 
the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as 
to the ineffective-assistance claim."12 Id. As such, "[w]ithout the help of an adequate 
attorney, a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim." Id. Therefore, counsel needs to be appointed in 
such situations. See id. 
The Supreme Court also recognized that "[c]laims of ineffective assistance at trial 
often require investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy," implying that 
applicants for post-conviction relief often could not engage in that necessary 
12 This language is particularly applicable to Idaho. In Idaho, post-conviction is 
undisputedly the first designated proceeding for the applicant to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549; Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443; 
see also Trevino v. Thaler, 113 S. Ct. 1911 (May 28, 2013) (clarifying that where the 
procedures set up by the state, while not requiring claims of ineffective assistance to be 
made in post-conviction, would make it "highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant 
will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trail 
counsel on direct appeal, our holding in Martinez applies" and the post-conviction is 
considered the first designated proceeding to raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims). Therefore, it is the equivalent of his direct appeal in that regard, and therefore, 
the pro se applicant needs the assistance of counsel to effectively prosecute his claims. 
See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1311-12. 
10 
investigation, but appointed counsel could.13 Id. The Supreme Court even addressed 
this issue in terms of the system that Idaho employs for resolving ineffective assistance 
claims: 
When the issue [of ineffective assistance of counsel] cannot be raised on 
direct review, . . . a prisoner asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding cannot rely on a 
court opinion or the prior work of an attorney addressing that claim. To 
present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the 
State's procedures, then, a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney. 
Id. (internal citations omitted; emphasis added); Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619. Based on 
all this language, it appears as though, given the chance, the United States Supreme 
Court will hold that, during the initial-review collateral proceeding, particularly if it is 
separate from the direct appeal, the applicant has a right to the assistance of counsel. 14 
See id. at 1315-17. 
However, the Supreme Court did express some concerns with making a ruling as 
to a potential constitutional right in this regard: doing so would deprive the states of the 
flexibility they currently enjoy in addressing post-conviction claims. See id. at 1319-20. 
Therefore, the Court gave the States the chance to "elect between appointing counsel in 
initial-review collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and raising a 
13 Mr. Grant specifically alleged that this was so in his case: "Because of [Mr.] Grant's 
status as an incarcerated individual, it is almost impossible for him to present evidence 
[as the district court is requiring]." (R., p.59.) Specifically, Mr. Grant asserted that he "I. 
[Is f]airly ignorant of the law and evidentiary requirements[;] II. Cannot go and collect 
paperwork and testimony in person[;] III. Is unsure of what evidence this Court would 
consider important and pertinent[;] IV. And is unable to properly write up a response that 
is adequate and up to the high standards this Court is accustomed to." (R., p.59.) As 
such, according to the United States Supreme Court, he "likely needs an effective 
attorney." Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added). 
14 In fact, in his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that the practical effect of the 
Martinez ruling and actually establishing a constitutional rule requiring appointment of 
counsel in collateral-review proceedings is, for all intents and purposes, the same. 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321-22, 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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defense on the merits in [such] proceedings." Id. at 1320. The Supreme Court 
concluded: "Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar 
a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial 
if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counselor counsel in that 
proceeding was ineffective." Id. at 1320. Therefore, Idaho's choice is to provide 
effective counsel in the initial-review collateral proceedings and allow its courts to 
decide these cases based on Idaho law, or to continue procedurally barring such claims 
and cede the authority to decide the merits of claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel to the federal courtS. 15 See id at 1319-20. 
As such, Idaho should recognize the wisdom inherent in the Martinez ruling: that 
in order to efficiently resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims, counsel needs to 
be appointed in the initial-review proceedings as part of the constitutional guarantees of 
due process. Because Idaho has separated such proceedings from the direct appeal 
process, that means counsel needs to be appointed for the initial proceedings before 
the district court. Therefore, this Court should recognize the existence of the right, 
under either the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. As 
such, the denial of post-conviction counsel during the initial-review collateral proceeding 
followed by the subsequent procedural bar of his claims - namely summary dismissal 
for the alleged failure to articulate sufficient facts to support the claims for relief (see 
R., pp.86-107) - means that the district court violated Mr. Grant's constitutional rights in 
15 In a special concurrence, Judge Burnett pointed out that Idaho, through the Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, had sought to avoid outside interference from the federal 
courts on these issues. Melligner v. State, 113 Idaho 31,35 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, 
J., specially concurring). 
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this regard. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315-21. Thus, because the district court 
violated Mr. Grant's right to due process in this manner, this Court should vacate the 
district court's order denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the 
order summarily dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings 
with the assistance of counsel. 
C. Alternatively, Mr. Grant Has A Statutory Right To Post-Conviction Counsel Under 
The Facts Of This Case, And Mr. Grant's Allegations Met The Statutory Standard 
For Appointment Of Counsel 
Should this Court decide that there is no constitutional right to post-conviction 
counsel in Idaho, see, e.g., Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902 (relying on Finley, 481 U.S. 551 
for the assertion that "there is no Sixth Amendment Right to counsel in a collateral 
attack upon a conviction"), it should still vacate the district court's decisions to deny 
Mr. Grant the assistance of post-conviction counsel and remand for further proceedings. 
Idaho law permits appointment of post-conviction counsel if the petitioner demonstrates 
the potential of a valid post-conviction claim. I.C. § 19-4904; Charboneau v. State, 140 
Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004) (hereinafter, Charboneau I). Therefore, since Mr. Grant has 
demonstrated the potential of a valid post-conviction claim, this Court should vacate the 
district court's order denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the 
order summarily dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings 
with the assistance of counsel. 
An applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to appointment of counsel if he 
"alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654 (2007); see also Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. Mr. Grant's assertions of facts in 
his verified pleadings and affidavits meet that standard. (See R., pp.1-8, 50-64.) As 
those allegations were verified, in that the documents in which they appear were 
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notarized, they constitute evidentiary facts which may be considered by the district court 
in support of the applicant's petition for relief. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 
(Ct. App. 1993); Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Along with his initial petition, Mr. Grant included his motion for appointment of 
counsel and the accompanying affidavit in support of the motion. (R., pp.10-11.) He 
renewed that request in his amended pleadings, informing the district court that he 
required the assistance of counsel to collect the necessary additional evidence to 
prove his allegations and present it in the form to which the district court was 
accustomed. (R., p.59.) Under the current standard, Mr. Grant only needed to allege 
facts that show "the possibility of a valid claim" in order to merit the appointment of 
counsel. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654 (emphasis added); Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
The elements of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are two-fold: 
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable (i.e., deficient); and there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for those errors 
(i.e., prejudice). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Estrada, 143 
Idaho at 561. For each of his claims (which will be discussed in detail infra), Mr. Grant 
alleged facts which show at least the possibility of a valid claim, in that his assertions of 
fact support at least one, if not both of the elements under Strickland. (See R., pp.1-8, 
50-64.) Therefore, he should have had counsel appointed during the post-conviction 
proceedings. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
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1. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid 
Claim That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing 
To Advise Him Of His Right To Remain Silent During The Psychological 
Evaluation Per The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada 
The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that counsel's performance is 
objectively insufficient if it fails to include informing a defendant of his right to remain 
silent during a presentence psychological evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. This 
privilege is well-established in precedent and applies in regard to all psychological 
evaluations occurring before sentencing or earlier in the judicial process. 
Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46 (2009); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871 (1989). 
This is because, unlike a routine presentence investigation, which relies heavily on 
information already available through public records, a psychological evaluation delves 
into more personal areas of the defendant's life, and thereby, presents a greater risk 
that he might make an incriminating statement during that evaluation. Estrada, 143 
Idaho at 562. Therefore, if counsel failed to inform Mr. Grant of his right to remain silent 
during the psychological evaluations conducted prior to his sentencing, that 
performance was deficient. Id. at 564. 
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings that his attorney did not advise him 
about his Estrada rights in regard to the psychological evaluation conducted as a part of 
the presentence investigation. (R., pp.3, 6, 54.) Mr. Grant also alleged that information 
obtained during this interview was used against him at his sentencing hearing. 
(R., p.54.) As part of his verified pleadings, it constitutes evidence that the district 
court could consider. Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such, Mr. Grant alleged facts which 
demonstrate a possibly valid claim that his attorney's performance was deficient in this 
regard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, because he 
alleged facts which show the possibility of a valid claim in this regard, counsel should 
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have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was in error. See Swader, 
143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
The district court impliedly took judicial notice of a guilty plea questionnaire filled 
out by Mr. Grant. (R., p.98 (citing "Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form, Idaho Criminal 
Rules Appendix A, April 22, 2010, 2,,).16 Mr. Grant's answers in those questionnaires do 
not, however, justify the district court's decision to deny Mr. Grant post-conviction 
counsel. All Mr. Grant had to do was present facts which showed the possibility of a 
valid claim. Estrada makes it clear that defense counsel is required to consult with his 
client as to the right to remain silent. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. Therefore, Mr. Grant's 
verified allegation that his attorney did not consult with him about these rights raised the 
possibility of a valid claim, and therefore, counsel should have been appointed and the 
district court's decision to the contrary is erroneous. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; 
Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
And while the questionnaire does remind the defendant that he still retains some 
right to remain silent (see Augmentation - Guilty Plea Questionnaire, p.2), that reminder 
does not relieve defense counsel of the obligation to consult with the defendant about 
those rights. See Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. In fact, if the district court's perspective 
were correct and the guilty plea questionnaire satisfactorily informed the defendant of 
the specific rights protected by Estrada, it would render the Estrada decision pointless, 
as defense attorneys could simply rely on that questionnaire to fulfill their obligation to 
their client. As such, it would significantly erode the protections afforded against self-
16 Mr. Grant filled out separate questionnaires in CR-2009-19445-FE and CR-19451, 
both of which bear the date "April 22, 2010." However, as they contain the same 
information as they relate to the claims on post-conviction, Mr. Grant has filed a motion 
requesting this Court take judicia! notice of both questionnaires contemporaneously with 
this brief. 
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incrimination during the presentence phase of the judicial process. Therefore, the 
information in the form guilty plea questionnaire does not disprove the facts alleged by 
Mr. Grant. The decision to deny him an attorney is thus, still erroneous. Swader, 143 
Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
Furthermore, Estrada dealt with a very specific matter - whether the defendant 
was advised by counsel as to his right to remain silent during psychological evaluations. 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. That protection does not extend to normal presentence 
investigations, however. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 461 (Ct. App. 
2009) (explaining the distinction the Estrada Court drew in this regard). As such, the 
generic assertion that the defendant may retain his right to remain silent in unspecified 
future proceedings contained in the form questionnaire to which the district court 
referred does not actually provide the protection necessary under Estrada. Swader, 
143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
In fact, the questionnaire that Mr. Grant filled out has a very specific question in 
regard to Estrada: "Has your attorney advised you that you have a constitutional right 
not to submit to a court ordered psychosexual evaluation for purposes of sentencing?" 
(Augmentation - Guilty Plea Questionnaire, p.6 (emphasis added).) Mr. Grant was not 
being required to submit to a psychosexual examination, nor had he been charged with 
a crime that would even raise the question of whether a psychosexual examination was 
required. (See Augmentation - Guilty Plea Questionnaire, p.1 (the two questionnaires 
indicated that they were related to charges for possession of methamphetamine and 
domestic battery).) Pursuant to the concept of expressio unius est exlusio alterius, 
the use of this particular item excludes other, though-similar, items from inclusion in the 
statement. See St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 
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479,487 (2009); State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 165-66 (Ct. App. 1995) (pursuant to 
this concept, statute listing potential victims under the restitution framework did not 
include parties not specifically named in the list). Therefore, all the guilty plea 
questionnaire actually informed Mr. Grant of, in regard to Estrada, was that he did not 
have to participate in a psychosexual evaluation; it did not provide him with information 
regarding his constitutional rights regarding participation in a psychological evaluation, 
which is different from a psychosexual evaluation. Compare I.C. § 19-2524 (identifying 
and authorizing psychological evaluations) with I.C. § 18-8316 (identifying and 
authorizing psychosexual evaluations). Therefore, even if the guilty plea questionnaire 
is properly considered, it does not contradict Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to consult with him regarding his right to remain silent during a 
psychological evaluation. See Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562 
However, even if that distinction is disregarded, the questionnaires still do not 
actually disprove Mr. Grant's allegation that his attorney failed to advise him pursuant to 
Estrada. As a practical matter, there is no reason for counsel to fully advise his client 
about the right to remain silent during a court-ordered psychological evaluation until 
after the district court actually orders such an evaluation. Counsel may be able to 
guess whether the district court is likely to order such an evaluation, but until it is 
ordered, counsel will not be fully informed of the situation (whether there will be an 
evaluation, who will conduct it, etc.). As such, until the evaluation is actually ordered, 
counsel will be unable to fully advise his client as to whether or not the client should 
invoke his rights at the court-ordered hearing. U[TJhe decision to be made regarding the 
proposed psychiatric evaluation is 'literally a life or death matter' and is 'difficult ... even 
for an attorney' because it requires 'a knowledge of what other evidence is available, of 
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the particular psychiatrist's biases and predilections, and of possible alternative 
strategies at the sentencing hearing.'" Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981) 
(quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979)) (emphasis added).17 As 
the United States Supreme Court pointed out, counsel's advice in this regard hinges, in 
part, on counsel knowing who will perform the evaluation, which is a fact that will not be 
known until the district court orders the evaluation be performed. Since the district court 
does not order such an evaluation until after the plea is entered and accepted, counsel's 
Estrada obligation cannot practically be fulfilled before the entry of plea. Therefore, the 
answers to the guilty plea questionnaire cannot conclusively disprove Mr. Grant's claim 
that his attorney did not meet his obligation under Estrada. Counsel had the opportunity 
after the plea was entered and after Mr. Grant indicated that he was pleased with 
counsel's performance to fail to meet his obligation under Estrada. It would be at that 
point that Mr. Grant would become displeased with counsel's ineffective performance. 
As such, the answers in his guilty plea questionnaire and his allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in this regard are not mutually exclusive. 
Rather, Mr. Grant would not have known, nor would he have had a reason to 
know, that his attorney's performance had been deficient until after he filled out the 
guilty plea questionnaire and entered his plea of guilty. The Kentucky Court of Appeals 
has articulated this concept best: 
While a defendant's representations [during the entry of a guilty plea] 
constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent proceeding, that barrier 
is not insurmountable. A defendant's statements at the guilty plea hearing 
concerning his relationship with counsel must be evaluated in light of what 
the defendant knew or should have known and do not necessarily 
preclude him from subsequently raising issues of ineffective assistance. 
17 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[t]he analsyis in Estelle [] is instructive." 
Estrada 143 Idaho at 562. 
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Johnson v. Commonwealth, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2003 WL 1786719, *6 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted).18 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
also addressed similar situations and decided that the sequence of events in such 
claims is important, determining that the petitioners' challenges to the voluntariness of 
their pleas could not be supported by allegations that counsel had performed deficiently 
after the plea was entered. United States v. Kerns, 53 Fed.Appx. 863, 865-66 (10th Gir. 
2002); United States v. Ellis, 132 Fed.Apps. 209, 211 (10th Gir. 2005); United 
States v. Lamson, 132 Fed.Appx. 213, 215 (10th Gir. 2005). Therefore, since Mr. Grant 
could not have known or complained of the deficient performance at the guilty plea 
hearing, the district court's use of the guilty plea questionnaire against this claim (see 
R., p.99) was erroneous. Accordingly, Mr. Grant has alleged facts demonstrating the 
possibility of a valid claim (which is true even if the answers to the guilty plea 
questionnaire are taken into consideration), and therefore, should have been appointed 
counsel. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
As an additional result, even if the guilty plea questionnaire does tend to disprove 
Mr. Grant's allegations, denying Mr. Grant assistance of counsel was still inappropriate. 
The conflict between the questionnaire and the allegations would only create a genuine 
issue of material fact (whether or not sufficient consultation was given in regard to 
Mr. Grant's Estrada rights before the psychological examination was conducted). As 
such, there was still the potential that counsel could have assisted Mr. Grant to perfect 
18 In Kentucky, unpublished appellate decisions entered after January 1, 2003, are not 
binding precedent, but "may be cited for consideration by the court if there is no 
published decision that would adequately address the issue before the court," provided 
a copy of the entire unpublished decision is provided to the court and counsel. KY ST 
RGP Rule 76.28(4)(c). Therefore, as there does not appear to be a published opinion 
on this point, the decision in Johnson v. Commonwealth is appended to this brief. 
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that claim and overcome the implications to the contrary, if any, in the guilty plea 
questionnaire. Therefore, the district court's decision to deny Mr. Grant the assistance 
of counsel was erroneous because nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Grant has 
failed to allege facts which revealed a possible valid claim for post-conviction relief. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793. 
2. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Present A Possible Valid Claim That His 
Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Not Reviewing The PSI With 
Mr. Grant Or Assisting Him To Object To Erroneous Or Unreliable 
Information Contained In The PSI 
The information included in PSis must be reliable; otherwise, it is inappropriate 
for the district court to consider it at sentencing. I.C.R. Rule 32(e)(1). Information 
included in a PSI may be presumed reliable if the defendant is afforded an opportunity 
to challenge, explain, or rebut that information. State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 263 
(1998). Mr. Grant alleged in his response to the district court's notice of intent to 
dismiss his claim that he had been deprived of that opportunity because his attomey 
had failed to review the PSI with him or to assist him in challenging erroneously-
included or otherwise unreliable information contained therein. (R., p.56.) Such a 
failure is objectively unreasonable performance by an attorney, particularly because 
erroneously-included or unreliable information in a PSI can haunt a defendant in 
numerous future proceedings. See Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1. As a result, those 
allegations also demonstrate the prejudice of counsel's ineffective performance. See id. 
Therefore, since the verified and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant alleged presented a 
possible valid claim for post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed 
and the decision to deny him counsel was in error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; 
Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793. 
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3. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Valid Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel That His Attorney Provided Ineffective 
Assistance By Not Presenting Certain Mitigating Evidence 
In regard to Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by 
not presenting certain mitigating evidence, the district court properly noted in its notice 
of intent to dismiss that Mr. Grant had not identified what mitigating evidence his 
attorney had purportedly failed to present, and so he had not sufficiently supported his 
claim. (R, pp.38-39.) 
However, in his response to that notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Grant did identify 
the evidence to which he was referring. (R., pp.52-53, 56-59.) Specifically, he alleged 
that there were two witnesses, one of whom would have contradicted the victim's 
version of events and who would have testified as to the overall inadequacies of the 
investigation, and another who would have testified that the police had "'lost' testimony" 
or other evidence that should have been presented to the district court. (R, pp.58-59.) 
In addition, he explained that there were several mental health examination reports 
which would demonstrate that he should have been considered for mental health court, 
or that would otherwise have provided the district court with a more complete 
perspective of his mental health issues. 19 (R, pp.52-53, 56-57.) Strongly implied in 
these assertions is that, had the district court been presented with this evidence, 
Mr. Grant would have received a more lenient sentence. (See R, pp.52-53, 56-59.) 
19 In a clear demonstration of the Catch-22 to which the district court subjected 
Mr. Grant in regard to sufficiently articulating his claims, it found that he had presented 
no evidence to support his own allegations as to whether he might have been accepted 
into the mental health court program (R, p.96), but would not give him counsel to help 
investigate the viability of that claim by obtaining the necessary evidence (which 
Mr. Grant alleged existed, but was unattainable by him due to his incarceration). 
(See, e.g., R, p.53.) In essence, the district court required him to provide it with 
evidence that it was not possible for him to get 
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Regardless, because the verified and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant alleged demonstrate the 
possibility of a valid claim for post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed 
and the decision to deny him counsel was in error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; 
Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Section I(C)(1), supra, the idea that Mr. Grant's 
answers on the guilty plea questionnaire conclusively disprove these allegations is 
illogical, since the actions which are alleged deficient occurred at the sentencing 
hearing. (See R., pp.58-59.) As such, any information in the answers to the guilty plea 
questionnaire is irrelevant to this claim. See Johnson, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2003 
WL 1786719, *6. Mr. Grant could not have known or complained of the deficient 
performance at the guilty plea hearing, and thus, the district court's use of the guilty plea 
questionnaire against this claim (see R., p.99) was erroneous. Since Mr. Grant alleged 
facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim in this regard, the district court erred 
by not appointing him an attorney. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho 
at 793. 
4. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid 
Claim That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To 
Move For A Change Of Venue Or Disqualification Of The Presiding Judge 
Mr. Grant asserted that his attorney should have moved for a change of venue or 
to disqualify the presiding judge because of specific prejudicial circumstances. For 
example, Mr. Grant alleged that that the victim's mother may have been able to 
influence the investigation based on her position within the police department and that 
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the presiding judge may have had a bias against Mr. Grant based upon the judge's 
representation of Mr. Grant's brother.2o (See R., p.52) 
The district court dismissed that claim because it determined that decision was a 
tactical decision left to the discretion of trial counsel and, according to the district court, 
there was no evidence in the record which would establish the basis for such a claim. 
(R., pp.35-36.) To support its decision, the district court cited State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 
917, 923 (1982) (hereinafter, Carter I). The decision in Carter I was vacated when a 
new trial was granted pursuant to a successful post-conviction action. See 
Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788 (1985) (hereinafter, Carter II). The Supreme Court held, 
in regard to the decision to pursue a change of venue in post-conviction, that the critical 
aspect of its determination on the direct appeal (Carter I) was that it informed Mr. Carter 
that the proper forum to challenge such a decision by his attorney was in post-
conviction, where he could present new evidence that was simply not available in the 
direct appeal record. Carter/I, 108 Idaho at 792. The Court stated: "However, and of 
crucial importance to the present proceeding, we went on to state that, 'If evidence to 
the contrary is available outside the record, it may be presented only by way of a 
petition for post-conviction relief .... '" Id. As Mr. Carter proceeded to follow that 
instruction, barring the challenge in light of that additional evidence, would be improper. 
Id. Therefore, if Mr. Grant had evidence with which to supplement the record and 
20 The district court cited to Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333 (Ct. App. 1998), to 
support its actions in this regard. (R., p.36.) In that case, however, the applicant failed 
to point to any specific evidence "which might reveal the district court's bias." Small, 
132 Idaho at 333. Thus, there was no evidence which would demonstrate that the 
attorney had been objectively unreasonable by not requesting the judge's recusal. See 
id. In this case, however, Mr. Grant has pointed to specific evidence which might reveal 
bias on the part of the district court, and so, Mr. Grant should have at least had the aid 
of an attorney to fully investigate and prosecute that argument in post-conviction. See 
Martinez, 132 U.S. at 1317; Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
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demonstrate the inadequacy of counsel's consideration of the question of venue, that is 
a viable issue on post-conviction. See id. 
Mr. Grant alleged facts that cause serious pause in regard to his trial attorney's 
decision to not pursue a change of venue. (See R., p.52) If true, they establish the 
objective unreasonableness of Mr. Grant's attorney's decision to not request a change 
of venue. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Carter /I, 108 Idaho at 792. Those 
allegations also imply the argument that the decision to not challenge venue caused 
prejudice to Mr. Grant through the loss of due process and a neutral magistrate. 21 
Therefore, because Mr. Grant alleged facts which demonstrate the possibility of a valid 
claim, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was 
in error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
5. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid 
Claim That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Inducing His 
Guilty Plea With The Assurance That Jurisdiction Would Be Retained 
While He Participated In The Rider Program 
If an attorney provides his client with advice which goes beyond the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys during the plea process, that advice may deprive 
the plea of the requisite voluntariness. Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884 (Ct. App. 
2008). To prove prejudice, the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable probability 
21 Mr. Grant recognizes that, usually, the decision of whether or not to request a change 
of venue is a tactical decision that will not be reviewed in post-conviction. See, e.g., 
State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175 (Ct. App. 1993). However, Carter /I still provides that 
challenges to such decisions are appropriately raised in post-conviction and, with 
sufficient evidence, may be viable. Carter II, 108 Idaho at 792 (quoting Carter I, 103 
Idaho at 923) (holding that "the alleged deficiencies fell into the area of strategic and 
tactical choices and that the record was 'devoid of any indication that such choices were 
a result of inadequate preparation or ignorance of counsel. ... Absent such evidence' 
we held 'it must be presumed that defense counsel's actions were not [ineffective]") 
(emphasis added). 
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that, absent the deficient advice, he would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Id. 
Initially, Mr. Grant failed to articulate the "false assurances" which would demonstrate 
the deficient advice he claimed occurred. (R., pp.7, 44-45.) However, in his response 
to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, he clarified his claim, alleging that his 
attorney told him the district court had agreed in a meeting in chambers to impose 
concurrent sentences that would not exceed a unified term of ten years with four years 
fixed, and also that trial counsel also told him he could expect a period of retained 
jurisdiction. (R., p.57.) Mr. Grant also stated in his verified amended pleadings that, but 
for those assurances, there was "a strong likelihood" that he would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial. (R., p.58.) If true, those allegations present at least a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the objective unreasonableness of that advice, as well as the 
prejudice arising from that erroneous advice. Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 884. 
As such, the verified and unrefuted facts alleged by Mr. Grant demonstrate a 
possible viable claim for relief. Therefore, counsel should have been appointed and the 
decision to deny him counsel was in error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau I, 
140 Idaho at 793. 
6. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Viable Claim That 
He Was Incompetent To Enter A Knowing, Voluntary, And Intelligent 
Guilty Plea 
Mr. Grant alleged that his mental health issues made him incompetent to enter a 
guilty plea. (R., pp.5, 56-57.) In post-conviction actions, the applicant must "present 
admissible evidence showing that there is a reasonable probability that he was 
incompetent at the time he entered his plea" in order to succeed on a claim of 
incompetence. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 678 (2009). To demonstrate 
incompetence, an applicant must show that he lacked "the capacity to [(1)] understand 
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the proceedings against him and (2) assist in his defense.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833,842 (1975) (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960))). 
Mr. Grant alleged that he was incompetent due to his mental health issues. (R., pp.5, 
56-57.) He also informed the district court that various medical records from 
examinations would support his allegations, but due to his incarceration, he was unable 
to provide them to the district court. 22 (R., p.57.) These alleged facts demonstrate the 
possibility of a valid claim that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As 
such, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was in 
error. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 793. 
As with Mr. Grant's allegations in terms of his Estrada rights (see Section I(C)(1), 
supra), the district court attempted to justify its actions based on the form guilty plea 
questionnaire. (R., p.102.) However, as explained supra, that information, at most, 
established a genuine issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. It does 
not demonstrate that Mr. Grant had failed to allege facts showing the possibility of a 
valid claim, and therefore, he should have been appointed counsel. Swader, 143 Idaho 
at 654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
Therefore, since the facts Mr. Grant alleged, which show the possibility of 
multiple viable post-conviction claims, the district court's decision to deny Mr. Grant the 
assistance of post-conviction counsel was erroneous. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654; 
Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. Whether as a result of his constitutional rights to due 
22 As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, such offers of proof could be considered to 
corroborate the applicant's statements if they spoke to the applicant's incompetency 
during the relevant period of time (the change of plea hearing). Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 
678. It is also one of the reasons that the United States Suprmee Court has identified 
as revealing why such petitioners "likely need" the assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct at 1317. 
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process or pursuant to the governing state statute, Mr. Grant was entitled to the 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore, this Court should vacate the district 
court's order denying the appointment of counsel, as well as the order summarily 
dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further proceedings with the 
assistance of counsel. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief Without Properly Considering The Undisputed Factual Allegations He 
Made In His Verified Petition And Affidavit In Support Of That Petition 
A. Introduction 
In addition to its failure to provide post-conviction counsel when it was merited, 
the district court also applied the wrong laws and standards when it summarily 
dismissed Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief. In a continuing theme, it did not 
recognize that the statements of fact set forth in Mr. Grant's verified statement and 
pleadings, as well as the attached affidavit in support of his petition, constituted 
evidence it needed to consider when determining whether Mr. Grant had pled a genuine 
issues of material fact. It also failed to realize that when these statements of fact went 
unrefuted by the State (which apparently never filed an answer in this case), it had to 
accept those statements of fact as true for purposes of summary disposition. 
Additionally, those facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom had to be construed in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party (i.e., Mr. Grant). A proper application 
of these standards also shows that Mr. Grant presented several genuine issues of 
material fact which, if true, would entitle him to relief. As such, summary dismissal was 
improper and this case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
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B. The District Court Failed To Apply The Proper Standards Or Recognize What 
Evidence It Could Consider, And So Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Grant's 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
As a preliminary matter, the district court committed reversible error by failing to 
recognize the evidence available for its consideration (the facts Mr. Grant himself 
alleged to be true) or giving that evidence its proper weight (presumed true, as they 
were undisputed). See Mata, 124 Idaho at 593; Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 
(2008). As such, its determinations on all the specific issues are tainted beyond 
reconciliation and this Court should remand this case for a proper determination under 
the proper standards. See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007) 
(hereinafter, Charboneau II). The district court consistently failed to act in accordance 
with these standards. This is true despite the fact that, while previewing its discussion 
of each of Mr. Grant's claims, it recognized that it need not accept applicant's 
allegations unsupported by admissible evidence. (R., p.31 (quoting Goodwin v. State, 
138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2003». However, it also needed to realize that 
Mr. Grant's verified allegations constituted admissible evidence. Mata, 124 Idaho at 
593. Therefore, its constant assertions that there was no admissible evidence 
supporting Mr. Grant's claims demonstrates error, affecting the whole process. (See, 
e.g., R., pp.31, 37, 38, 39,41,43,44,46,47,48,86,90,92,95,96,98,100,101,102, 
103, 104, 105, 106.) 
In terms of summary dismissal in post-conviction actions, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has clarified that only "[w]hen the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle 
the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without an evidentiary 
hearing." Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. Therefore, if the alleged facts, if assumed 
to be true, would support the claim, summary dismissal is inappropriate. Id. And 
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among the facts that the district court may consider, according to the Idaho Supreme 
Court, are verified facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant set forth in 
"affidavits, records or other evidence." Id.; Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. According to the 
Court of Appeals, "[a] verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the 
personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is 
accorded the same probative force as an affidavit." Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such, 
the allegations in the verified filings alone can provide evidence "sufficient to raise a 
factual issue requiring an evidentiary hearing." Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. 
Thus, the verified pleadings alone can provide the prima facie showing to overcome 
summary dismissal. Id. 
Nevertheless, the district court failed to apply those rules and held that most of 
Mr. Grant's allegations were not supported by such evidence, regardless of the fact that 
they were set forth in verified pleadings and affidavits, but determined rather that his 
allegations were bare. (See, e.g., R., pp.37, 38, 39,41,43,44,46,47,86,90,91,92, 
95,96,98, 101, 102, 103,104, 105, 106.) The fact that they were bare does not mean 
that the district court was free to ignore them - the question it had to consider was 
whether those allegations, bare though they may have been, if presumed to be true,23 
would entitle Mr. Grant to relief. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho 
23 To presume a claim to be true means that it is considered to be accurate, even if 
other evidence might suggest otherwise. Where, as here, the district court summarily 
dismisses a claim because of potentially contradictory evidence, it has erroneously 
applied the presumption of accuracy to the other evidence, not to the claim. 
Practically speaking, all the potentially contradictory evidence does in the face of 
an appropriately-applied presumption is create a genuine issue of material fact. If a 
genuine issue of material fact exists, an evidentiary hearing is a necessity. See, e.g., 
Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 157. Therefore, when the presumption is accurately applied, the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's petition. 
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at 153. Mr. Grant's allegations met that standard, and so he should have been afforded 
an evidentiary hearing. 
For example, in regard to Mr. Grant's claim regarding his Estrada rights, the 
district court stated: "However, Mr. Grant has presented no admissible evidence to 
demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding his rights to his 
participation in the psychological examination. Instead the Petitioner has only set forth 
unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which provide no relief under the Uniform Post 
Conviction Procedure Act." (R., p.98 (emphasis added).) This reasoning is clearly 
erroneous because Mr. Grant alleged in his pleadings that his attorney did not advise 
him about his Estrada rights. (R., pp.3, 6.) Those petitions and affidavits were verified. 
(R., pp.7, 60.) As such, those allegations constituted admissible, verified evidence 
supporting his claim for relief. Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. Furthermore, the district court's 
decision to summarily dismiss because "Mr. Grant has presented no admissible 
evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding his rights 
prior to his participation in the psychological examination," and because "the Petitioner 
has set forth unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which can provide no relief under 
the Uniform Post Conviction Act" (R., p.98), is directly contrary to established precedent, 
which provides that the verified petitions alone may be the basis for relief under the 
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.24 Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 
145 Idaho at 153; Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. The only evidence, presented in a verified 
24 The undue limitation of information that may be properly considered (i.e., the district 
court's refusal to consider the facts set forth in Mr. Grant's verified filings because they 
were just his assertions) constitutes an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
ef. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 (2008). As the district court has unduly 
limited its consideration of the evidence before it, it has abused its discretion in this 
manner, further justifying remanding this case for further proceedings. See id. 
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petition, was that Mr. Grant's attorney failed to advise Mr. Grant of his Estrada rights. 
Estrada makes it clear that, if true, that claim would entitle Mr. Grant to relief. 
Therefore, presuming the claim to be true (particularly as it was unrebutted by the 
State), the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. Charboneau II, 144 
Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
As another example, the district court stated that "Mr. Grant also submitted the 
Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which did not include any 
additional documents or affidavits." (R, p.86.) This is another clearly erroneous 
determination, since the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
was verified by a notary public. (R, p.60.) As such, it was essentially an affidavit. 
Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. Critically, this assertion by the district court came before it 
began discussing any of Mr. Grant's individual claims, which indicates that the 
erroneous rationale was applied to all the ensuing subsections. As a result of numerous 
misapplications of the Mata standard, both generally and to specific claims, the district 
court's errors significantly undermined the entire process. Therefore, this case should 
be remanded for a proper determination in regard to summary disposition. 
However, the district court's failure to apply established precedential standards 
did not stop there. Even when it did accept the evidence Mr. Grant presented, it did not 
give it the appropriate weight. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153 (recognizing that if the 
allegations are unrefuted, they must be accepted as true for purposes of summary 
disposition). The State did not file an answer in this case. (See generally R) As such, 
Mr. Grant's allegations were never refuted. Therefore, at least for purposes of summary 
disposition, Mr. Grant's factual allegations had to be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 
Idaho at 153. Furthermore, in summary disposition proceedings, those facts and all 
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reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the nonmoving party.25 
Charboneau 1/, 144 Idaho at 903. Rather than apply these standards, the district court 
made impermissible determinations that the evidence was insufficient or that Mr. Grant 
had failed to prove the allegation. (See, e.g., R., pp.39, 40, 41, 48, 98, 100, 104) At the 
summary judgment phase, a petitioner is not required to prove his claim; rather, the 
petitioner is required to show a potential claim that, if he can prove it at an evidentiary 
hearing,26 would entitle him to relief. Charboneau fI, 144 Idaho at 903. If Mr. Grant's 
uncontested allegations are properly accepted as true, then Mr. Grant has sufficiently 
proved his allegations so as to merit an evidentiary hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 
153; Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. Again, by not following this precedent, the 
district court erred in such a way as to undermine the entire process. Therefore, this 
case should be remanded for a proper determination in regard to summary judgment. 
If Mata, Baldwin, Charboneau II, and Strickland are properly applied in this case, 
it is clear that Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present several genuine 
issues of material fact in regard to some, if not all, of his claims. Those genuine issues 
of material fact require an evidentiary hearing to sort out. See Franck-Teel v. State, 143 
Idaho 664, 667-68 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, the failure to comply with those standards 
25 In this case, summary dismissal proceedings were initiated by the district court, sua 
sponte, as the State did not file a motion for summary dismissal. (See generally, R.) As 
such, the party to be favored would be Mr. Grant, as he was the only party who would 
be adversely affected by the summary dismissal. See Charboneau fI, 144 Idaho at 903. 
26 If the petitioner is required to prove his claim in his initial pleadings, then there is 
never a reason to hold an evidentiary hearing, a result which would have serious due 
process implications as doing away with evidentiary hearings altogether would likely 
deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, not to mention, run afoul 
of the statutory procedure governing post-conviction, which provides for a hearing when 
the petitioner establishes a genuine issue of material fact. I.e. §§ 19-4906(b) & -4907. 
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alone demonstrates the need to vacate the summary dismissal order and remand the 
case for an evidentiary hearing. 
C. The District Court Failed To Apply The Appropriate Laws And Standards When It 
Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
In order to avoid summary dismissal, the defendant need only demonstrate that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906(c); Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 
903. In making such determinations, the district court is to construe the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 
903. In order to establish a genuine issue of material fact in regard to an ineffective 
assistance claim, the applicant need only present facts which would demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different (i.e., prejudiced him). Strickland, 
466 U.S at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, where the applicant has set forth 
verified facts which the district court may consider, and indeed must accept as true if 
they are unrefuted, which establish that his attorney's performance was objectively 
unreasonable and prejudiced him, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
In addition to its failure to properly consider the verified petitions, discussed 
supra, the district court also misinterpreted the prejudice prong of Strickland. To 
demonstrate prejudice, the applicant need only demonstrate that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
However, the district court required that Mr. Grant demonstrate that the outcome "WOUld 
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have been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors.,,27 (See, e.g., R., pp.47; 
see also R., pp.95, 96, 106.) The district court's requirement that Mr. Grant 
demonstrate that the outcome would have been different places a far more onerous 
burden on him than the one actually levied by the law: under the district court's 
standard, Mr. Grant would have to have proven there was no alternative but a different, 
favorable outcome, whereas Strickland only requires the applicant to demonstrate the 
possibility that a different outcome may have resulted. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; cf. 
Day, _ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (Ct. App. January 24, 2013) (discussing a 
similar standard regarding prejudice in terms of fundamental error, "[that standard] does 
not require Day to make such an affirmative showing. Rather, as Day asserts, [it] 
requires that Day must demonstrate there is a reasonable possibility that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial") (emphasis in original). Therefore, to meet that 
burden, Mr. Grant needed only to undermine confidence in the outcome (i.e., make it 
less certain as the result), not affirmatively prove an alternative outcome would have 
come to pass. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
If Mata, Baldwin, Charboneau II, and Strickland are properly applied in this case, 
it is clear that Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present several genuine 
issues of material fact in regard to some, if not all, of his claims.28 Those genuine issues 
27 To this same end, the district court was requiring Mr. Grant to prove his allegations by 
a preponderance of the evidence. (See, e.g., R., pp.37, 39) That burden is premature 
since demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different result establishes the 
genuine issue of material fact justifying a hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. It is 
at that subsequent evidentiary hearing that he is required to prove his claims by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 121 Idaho 257, 258 
(Ct. App. 1992) ("In a post-conviction relief hearing, the petitioner has the burden of 
proving the allegations which entitle him to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." 
~emphasis added)). 
8 In wrapping up its discussion of the individual claims, the district court stated "the 
Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no compelling argument 
35 
of material fact require an evidentiary hearing to sort out. See Franck-Teel, 143 Idaho 
at 667-68. As such, the failure to comply with those standards alone demonstrates the 
need to vacate the summary dismissal order and remand the case for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
D. In Regard To Several Of Mr. Grant's Specific Allegations, He Alleged Facts 
Which, If True! Would Entitle Him To Post-Conviction Relief! And Thus! Summary 
Dismissal Of His Claims Was In Error 
As discussed in Section I(C), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts demonstrating the 
possibility of several valid claims. In regard to some of them, his pro se pleadings also 
alleged sufficient facts that, at least, demonstrate genuine issues of material fact, which 
should have entitled him to an evidentiary hearing on those issues. However, on 
others, the record does not contain sufficient facts to make that assertion, usually 
because the prejudice caused by trial counsel's errors, while implied, was not actually 
articulated.29 However, they should remain viable issues on remand, since presumably! 
that the outcome of his case would have been different but for his attorney's errors." 
(R., p.106.) This statement imputes the erroneous standard to all of Mr. Grant's claims. 
In addition, the district court's additional requirement of a "compelling argument" is also 
erroneous at the summary judgment proceedings, as Mr. Grant need only demonstrate 
that, if true, his factual allegations would support his claims. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
The determination of whether the argument is compelling (i.e., proven to a sufficiency of 
the evidence) is one appropriately left until after the evidentiary hearing, after Mr. Grant 
has had the full opportunity to make a compelling argument based on all the evidence, 
for which he needed the assistance of counsel. See Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. 
As such, this is yet another clear demonstration of the district court's erroneous actions 
in this case. 
29 Issues in this situation include, but are not limited to, Mr. Grant's claim that his 
attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of his Estrada rights (see Section 
I(C)(1), supra), Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was ineffective for not reviewing the 
PSI with him or assisting him to object to erroneous or unreliable information therein 
(see Section I(C)(2), supra), Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was ineffective for not 
presenting certain, articulated, mitigating evidence (see Section I(C)(3), supra), and 
Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a change of 
venue or recusal of the district court judge (see Section I(C)(4), supra). 
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given the assistance of counsel, Mr. Grant to could file an amended petition articulating 
that prejudice and presenting genuine issues of material fact in regard to those claims. 
However, as there are some issues in which Mr. Grant did allege, at least, 
genuine issues of material fact, the district court's decision to summarily dismiss the 
petition was erroneous and should be reversed. 
1. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To 
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Him Of 
His Right To Remain Silent During The Presentence Investigations, Per 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada 
As explained in Section I(C)(1), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified 
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient, failing 
to inform him of his right to remain silent during the psychological examinations. 
(R., pp.3, 6, 54.) Mr. Grant also alleged that information obtained during this interview 
was used against him at his sentencing hearing. (R., p.54.) As such, those verified 
facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's 
favor, would entitle him to relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, summary denial on that claim 
was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. See 
Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. 
2. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To 
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective By Inducing Him To Plead 
Guilty Based On False Assurances Regarding His Potential Sentence 
As explained in Section I(C)(5), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified 
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney provided deficient representation by 
inducing him to plead guilty based on false assurances as to the potential overall length 
of his sentence and his initial participation in the rider program. (R., p.57.) As such, this 
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robbed his guilty plea of the necessary voluntariness. See Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 884. 
He also alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this deficient 
performance, as he asserted in his verified response to the notice of intent to dismiss 
that there was "a strong likelihood" that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial. 
(R., p.58.) Since Mr. Grant need only undermine confidence in the outcome (in this 
case, the decision to plead guilty) to show prejudice, that verified allegation is sufficient 
to meet the requirement from Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As such, 
those verified facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in 
Mr. Grant's favor, would entitle him to relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, summary denial 
on that claim was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
See Charboneau 1/, 144 Idaho at 903. 
3. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him 
To Relief Because His Guilty Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently, And 
Voluntarily Entered 
As explained in Section I(C)(6), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified 
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
enter his guilty plea based on the fact that he was suffering a severe depressive 
episode associated with his mental health conditions. As such, those verified facts and 
reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's favor, 
would entitle him to relief. See Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 678. Therefore, summary 
dismissal on that claim was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing. See Charboneau 1/, 144 Idaho at 903. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the district court erroneously denied his request for the assistance of 
post-conviction counsel, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order 
denying him the assistance of counsel, as well as the order summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition, and remand this case for further proceedings. Additionally, 
because the district court erroneously summarily dismissed those claims, he 
respectfully requests this Court instruct that an evidentiary hearing be among those 
future proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2013. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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*1 Corey L. Johnson appeals from a Jefferson Circuit 
Court opinion and order which denied his Kentucky Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate, set 
aside or correct his thil1een-year sentence for assault, escape, 
resisting arrest, tampering with physical evidence and being 
a persistent felony offender. 
On the moming of August 14, 1999, at approximately 4:27 
a.m., Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff William Hutchison 
stopped Johnson on Interstate 65 allegedly for speeding 
and recklessly driving his motorcycle at approximately 110 
m.p.h. During the encounter, a struggle ensued after Deputy 
Hutchison allegedly put one handcuff on Johnson while 
placing him under arrest. In the struggle, Johnson hit Deputy 
Hutchison in the face several times causing injuries to his 
face including several lacerations, bruising, swelling and a 
fractured nose. Johnson left the scene on his motorcycle, 
and Deputy Hutchison was taken semi-conscious to the 
hospital emergency room for treatment. Later in the day at 
approximately 3:30 p.m., the police went to a motel on a 
report of a hit and mn involving a motorcycle and discovered 
Johnson's motorcycle with blood on it, the license plate 
removed, and a bloody shil1 in the motel lobby. Two days 
later, Johnson turned himself in to the police and was treated 
for injuries to his left hand. 
On August 17, 1999, a grand jury indicted Johnson in Case 
No. 99-CR-001999 for assault in the first degree (Assault 
I), I escape in the first degree (Escape I), 2 resisting arrest, 3 
and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree 
(PFO II) .4 On September 13, 1999, another grand jury 
returned a second indictment in Case No. 99-CR-002220 
charging Johnson with assault in the third degree (Assault 
III) 5 and tampering with physical evidence 6 involving the 
same incident with Deputy Hutchison. The two indictments 
were consolidated for fmiher proceedings. 
On September 2000, Johnson entered a guilty plea 
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford 7 and a plea agreement 
with the Commonwealth to an amended charge of assault in 
the second degree (Assault II), 8 Escape I, Resisting Arrest, 
Tampering with Physical Evidence, and PFO II. Under the 
plea agreement the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the 
count of Assault III and recommended sentences often years 
on both the Assault II and Escape I offenses enhanced to 
thirteen years for being a PFO II, five years for Tampering 
with Physical Evidence enhanced to ten years for being a 
PFO II, and twelve months for Resisting Arrest, all to run 
concurrently for a total sentence of thirteen years. 9 Johnson 
waived preparation of a presentence investigation report and 
the cifcuit court immediately sentenced him to serve thirteen 
years consistent with the Commonwealth's recommendation. 
On May 1, 2001, Johnson filed a pro se motion to vacate 
pursuant to RCf 11.42 based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, lack of evidence and double jeopardy. He also 
filed associated motions for an evidentiary hearing and 
appointment of counseL On May 7, 2001, the circuit court 
granted the motion to appoint counseL On October 18, 200 I, 
counsel filed a supplement to the RCr 11.42 motion alleging 
ineffective assistance for counsel's failure adequately to 
advise Johnson of a possible extreme emotional disturbance 
defense. On February 2, 2002, the circuit court rendered an 
opinion and signed an order denying the motion without a 
hearing stating that the guilty plea colloquy established that 
Johnson had not been nn'l11,rl""'Pri by counsel's representation, 
This appeal followed, 
'k2 Johnson raises numerous issues involving his guilty 
plea, most of which are based on a charge of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In order to establish ineffective 
assistance of a person must satisfy a two-part test 
showing both that counsel's performance was deficient and 
that the deficiency resulted in actual prejudice resulting 
in a proceeding that was ilmdamentally unfair. 10 Where 
an appellant challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective 
counsel, he must show both that counsel made serious 
errors outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance II and that the deficient performance so seriously 
affected the outcome of the plea proccss that, but for the 
errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the 
defendant would not have pled guilty, but rather would have 
insisted on going to trial. 12 The burden is on the defendant 
to overcome a strong presumption that counsel's assistance 
was constitutionally sufficient. 13 A court must be highly 
deferential in reviewing defense counsei's perfom1ance aud 
should avoid second'"guessing counsel's actions based on 
hindsight 14 Both the perfonnance and prejudice prongs 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard are mixed 
questions of law and [:let 15 While the trial court's factual 
findings pertaining to detennining ineffective assistance of 
counsel are subject to review only for clear error, the ultimate 
decision on the existence of deficient performance and actual 
prejudice is subject to de novo review on appeaL 16 
RCr II A2 provides persons in custody under sentence a 
procedure for raising collateral challenges to a judgment 
of conviction entered against them, A movant is not 
automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion, 17 However, an evidentiary hearing is required on an 
RCr 11 A2 motion where the issues raised in the motion are 
not refuted on the record, or where the allegations, even if 
true, would not be sufficient to invalidate the conviction. 18 
"A judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in the 
absence of evidence in the record refuting them," 19 
Johnson attacks his escape conviction on numerous grounds, 
First, he alleges that his plea to this offense was based on 
his understanding that he was pleading guilty to escape in 
the second degree,20 not escape in the first degree, While 
in one instance during the guilty plea hearing the trial judge 
did mistakenly refer to the charge as escape in the second 
in all other instances, which were numerous, he 
('m~pr·tlv referred to it as escape in the first degree, Also, the 
Commonwealth's Offer on a Plea of Guilty document signed 
Johnson clearly lists the offense as Escape L Johnson's 
claim that he thought he was pleading guilty to escape in 
the second 
record, 
is unreasonable and clearly refuted by the 
Johnson asserts that counsel was ineffective for not 
him that certain evidence concerning the events 
of the incident was inadmissible hearsay and failing 
to move to suppress such evidence prior to triaL This 
issue is based on Johnson's misunderstanding of legal 
procedure. The offensive so~called "hearsay evidence" is 
Johnson's characterization of "testimony" by Detective 
Jeffrey Whobrey, who investigated the case, Johnson states 
that counsel should have moved to suppress "testimony" 
by Detective Whobrey concerning statements made to 
him by Deputy Hutchison and other witnesses because 
the statements were inadmissible investigative hearsay, He 
further concludes that without Detective Whobrey's alleged 
testimony, the Commonwealth would have been 
unable to prove an element of escape, that being he was in 
custody prior to fleeing the scene. 
*3 This argument apparently is derived tJ'om statements 
made by the prosecutor at the guilty plea hearing during which 
he stated that the prosecution would present evidence that 
Johnson stmck Deputy Hutchison just after the deputy had 
placed one of the two handcuffs on Johnson while making 
an arrest. The prosecutor also stated that Detective Whobrey 
would testifY for the Commonwealth at triaL The prosecutor 
did not state that Detective Whobrey's testimony would be 
based on hearsay statements. The prosecutor mentioned that 
Detective Whobrey would testify that Deputy Hutchison's 
handcuffs were never recovered, Moreover, the prosecutor 
said Deputy Hutchison would testify that Johnson attacked 
him while he was arresting him. In conclusion, there was 
sufficient evidence other than any hearsay statements made 
to Detective Whobrey to support the escape charge and 
Johnson has not established that the detective would have 
even attempted to testifY at trial as to hearsay statements made 
to him. Consequently, defense counsel was not deficient in 
failing to move to suppress any alleged hearsay statements to 
Detective Whobrey prior to trial or not advising Johnson that 
such statements were inadmissible, 
Johnson also contends that defense counsel was ineffective 
for allowing him to plead guilty to tampering with physical 
evidence because the indictment with respect to that offense 
had been infonnally amended. He states that 
the indictment was originally based on his having fled the 
scene on his which had blood on it, but that the 
prosecutor stated at the guilty plea hearing that he would seek 
a conviction based on Johnson's removal from the scene of 
his blood-stained shirt and Deputy Hutchison's handcuffs. 21 
This argument is without merit. 
there is nothing in the record to support Johnson's 
assertion that the indictment was based solely on the removal 
of the motorcycle. The indictment charged Johnson with: 
Tampering with Physical Evidence 
when, believing that an official 
proceeding may be pending or 
instituted against him, he destroyed, 
mutilated, concealed, removed or 
altered the physical evidence which 
he believed was about to be produced 
or llsed in such official procecding, 
with the intent to impair its veracity or 
availability in an official proceeding, 
The indictment did not limit or restrict this count to the 
motorcycle. Even so, the prosecution notified the defense 
shortly aftcr auaignment through discovery of its intent to 
offer evidence on the handcuffs and bloody shirt at trial. An 
indictment may be amended at any time to conform to the 
proof at trial provided that no additional or different offense 
is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are 
not prejudiced by undue surprise. 22 The Commonwealth 
obtained an order from the court requiring Johnson to 
provide a blood sample for, inter alia, comparison with the 
bloodstains on the shirt recovered from the moteL Johnson did 
not deny having fought with and injuring Deputy Hutchison, 
but rather raised a justification defense. As a result, 
utilization of evidence concerning the handcuffs and bloody 
shirt to establish the offense of tampering with physical 
evidence would not have constituted an improper constructive 
amendment of the indictment. 23 Defense counsel was not 
deficient for advising Johnson to plead guilty to tampering 
with physical evidence based on the evidence proffered by the 
Commonwealth. 
*4 Johnson challenges the guilty plea by alleging that 
counsel erroneously told him that he would receive less than 
the maximum sentence on all the offenses. He asserts that 
counsel's faulty performance is evidenced by the fact that 
he received the maximum sentence on the tampering with 
physical evidence While Johnson did receive the 
maximum sentence for the wU'W'~'H'K with physical evidence 
he received less than the maximum sentence on the 
Assault II and Escape I offenses, which carried sentence 
up to twenty years as enhanced by the PFO II offense. 
Moreover, the sentences for all the offenses involving Deputy 
Hutchison were run concurrently, rather than consecutively, 
so Johnson did not receive the maximum sentence. Even 
assuming counsel told Johnson he would receive less than 
the maximum sentence on all the charges, counsel was not 
deficient because this advice was not erroneous. 
Johnson also attacks his guilty plea to the Assault II 
offense based on his contention that counsel failed to 
investigate the extent of Deputy Hutchison's injuries, failed 
to advise him of the potential defense of extreme emotional 
disturbance, and failed to advise him of and challenge the 
indictments on double jeopardy grounds. With respect to the 
officer's injuries, Johnson objects to the Commonwealth's 
characterization of Deputy Hutehison's injuries as "broken 
bones" in describing the evidence Juring the guilty plea 
hearing in support of the assault He notes that 
the medical records refer to the deputy's nose injury as 
"comminuted bone fracture." While the extent of injury is 
a factor differentiating Assault I (requiring serious physical 
injury) and A.ssault II (requiring physical injury), Johnson 
has not shown that this issue renders his guilty plea suspect. 
The Commonwealth stated that if the case had gone to 
trial, it could produce testimony from a medical expert 
that Deputy Hutchison's injuries constituted serious physical 
injury. The record indicates that defense counsel employed 
and received an opinion from a medical expert, but the 
exact content of that opinion is not revealed. Nevertheless, 
Deputy Hutchison clearly suffered physical injury. Deputy 
Hutchison's statements and the nature of his injuries also 
suggest that he was hit in the face with an instrument, 
presumably the handcuffs. Given the location and extent of 
the injuries, the handcuffs arguably would have constituted 
a "dangerous instrument." 24 There was sufficient evidence 
of the elements for Assault II. Accordingly, Johnson has not 
shown counsel's performance was deficient or that he suffered 
actual prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability he 
would not have been convicted of Assault II at trial. 
Johnson asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
inform him that he could not be convicted of both Assault I 
and Assault III under the prohibition against double jeopardy. 
He states counsel should have sought to dismiss one of 
the assault counts on double jeopardy grounds. The double 
jeopardy clause ofthe Fifth Amendment ofthe United States 
Constitution states that no person shall be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jcopardy of life or limb, Section 
13 ofthe Kentucky Constitution contains a similar provision, 
Double jeopardy prohibits: (l) a second prosecution for 
the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution 
for the same offense after conviction; and (3) mUltiple 
punishments for the same offense,25 This case implicates 
the multiple punishments aspect of the double jeopardy 
protection involving multiple prosecutions within the same 
proceeding. In this type of situation, if double jeopardy 
applies to multiple offenses, the propcr procedure is to tailor 
the instmctions to require alternative findings of guilt, rather 
than dismissal of a charge prior to trial. 26 The double 
jeopardy clause does not preclude multiple convictions, 
only judgments imposing multiple punishments. 27 Thus, 
Johnson's assertion that counsel was ineffective for not 
seeking dismissal of one of the assault charges prior to trial 
is incorrect 
*5 In addition, Johnson's claim that double jeopardy would 
punishment for both Assault I and Assault II appears 
to be erroneous. In Commonwealth v. 28 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court adopted the "same elements" test enunciated 
in Btockburger v< United States, 29 for determining when a 
single act or transaction may violate two distinct statutory 
provisions for purposes of double jeopardy, Under this test, 
"[d]ouble jeopardy does not occur when a person is charged 
with two crimes arising from the same course of conduct, 
as long as each statute 'requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not.' ,,30 The Kentucky Supreme Court 
has stated the Blockburger analysis is the exclusive test for 
determining double jeopardy involving multiple statutes. 31 
It focuses on the statutory elements and the indictment rather 
than the entire conduct of the defendant 32 The Blockburger 
analysis requires proof of an additional fact or element for 
each offense not necessary to establish the other offense. 33 
In the current case, Johnson was indicted for Assault I under 
KRS 50S,OlD, which involves intentionally causing serious 
physical injury to another person by mean of a deadly weapon 
or a dangerous instrument, and for Assault III under KRS 
50S.025(a)(1), which involves intentionally causing physical 
injury to a peace officer. In addition, Assault II under KRS 
50S.020(I)(b) involves intentionally causing physical injury 
to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instmment. Applying the same elements test, intentional 
Assault I or Assault IT of use of a deadly 
weapon or dangerous instmment not necessmy to establish 
Assault III. Similarly, intentional Assault III requires proof 
that the victim be a peace officer, which is not necessary to 
prove Assault I or Assault II. Accordingly, intentional assault 
of a peace officer would not constitute a lesser included 
offense of either Assault I or Assault II and punishment 
for Assault III and either Assault I or Assault II would not 
be barred by double jeopardy, 34 Assault II was intended 
to punish and prevent injurious behavior directed at law 
enforcement personnel, while Assault J and Assault II require 
use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instmment. The former 
targets a specific type of victim and the latter target an 
instmmentality. Thus, Johnson's counsel would not have been 
dcficient for failing to advise him about a double jeopardy 
defense, 
Even if a double jeopardy defense was available, Johnson 
has not shown that he sutTered actual prejudice by counsel's 
failure to advise him of it Under the plea agreement, Johnson 
pled guilty to the amended charge of Assault II and the 
Commonwealth moved to dismiss the Assault III charge. 
As stated earlier, there was sufficient evidence to submit 
instmctions on Assault I, Assault II, and Assault III to the 
jury, While the issue of the extent of Deputy Hutchison's 
injuries was disputed, the evidence supporting Assault II was 
very strong, Therefore, there is not a reasonable probability 
that had he gone to trial, Johnson would have been acquitted 
of Assault II and his decision whether to plead guilty would 
have been different based on any double jeopardy bar. 
*6 Finally, Johnson contends counsel was ineffective for 
failing to advise him of a possible extreme emotional 
disturbance defense< In his affidavit accompanying the 
supplemental RCr 11 A2 motion, Johnson alleges Deputy 
Hutchison made a racial comment and suggested he could 
afford such a nice motorcycle because he was a drug dealer. 
He states that the officer "without warning" sprayed him with 
Mace several times and then knocked him off his motorcycle. 
Johnson continues: 
By way of reaction to this unexpected attack and acting 
solely by instinct and in fear of my personal safety and 
wellbeing, I pushed Hutchinson [sic] away from me while 
attempting to block any more [M]ace being shot in my 
face. At this point Deputy Hutchinson [sic] plainly stated 
"Oh, we got us a nigger that likes to resist arrest .n well I 
got something for you bitch!' Hutchinson [sic] then stmek 
affiant with a left hook thereby beginning a brief stmggle 
wherein affiant was forced to protect himself from what 
was obviously a dangerous and volitable [sic] situation. 
Affiant, acting in fear of his own if not his very life, 
broke away from the Deputy, picked up his motorcycle and 
left the scene, leaving Hutchinson [sic] still on the ground 
constantly spraying [M]ace and cursing me. 
Extreme emotional disturbance has been defined as "a 
temporary state of mind so enraged, int1amcd, or disturbed 
as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one 
to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the 
extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or 
malicious purposes." 35 Extreme emotional disturbance 
requires provocation with a "triggering event" that is 
sudden and unintemlpted,36 and involves viewing the 
circumstances subjectively from the defendant's point of 
view. 37 "Evidence of mere 'hurt' or 'anger' is insufficient 
. I d' b 38 'rh' f to prove extreme emotlOna 18tur ance. e eXistence a 
extreme emotional disturbance serves to mitigate punishment 
rather than provide total exoneration, and generally must be 
proven by the defendant. 39 Under KRS 508.040( 1), extreme 
emotional disturbance is available as a defense to prosecution 
for an intentional assault in the first, second or fOUlih 
degree, but not assault in the third degree. 40 Conviction 
for assault under extreme emotional disturbance reduces the 
classification and resulting range of punishment for offenses 
that otherwise would constitute Assault I (Class B felony) and 
Assault II (Class C felony) to one to five years commensurate 
with a Class D felony" 41 
In the current case, Johnson asserts that defense counsel 
never advised him of the availability of an extreme emotional 
disturbance defense and that he would have decided to go 
to trial rather than plead guilty had he been so advised. 
The circuit court denied the RCr 11.42 motion and an 
evidentiary hearing primarily based on the guilty plea 
colloquy in which Johnson stated that he was satisfied with 
counsel's advice. While a defendant's representations at a 
Boyken 42 hearing constitute a formidable barrier in any 
subsequent proceeding, that barrier is not insurmountable. 43 
A defendant's statements at the guilty plea hearing concerning 
his relationship with counsel must be evaluated in light of 
what the defendant knew or should have known and do not 
necessarily preclude him from subsequently raising issues of 
ineffective assistance. Representations in response to general 
questions do not conclusively refute specific allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel sufficicnt to justifY denial 
of a hearing. 44 The availability of an extreme emotional 
disturbance defense was not specifically discussed at the 
Boyken hearing and neither Johnson's representations during 
that hearing nor anything else in the rccord clearly refilte his 
claim that counsel did not advise him of that defenseo 
*7 The circuit court also found that Johnson failed to 
establish he was prejudiced by counsel's representation, but it 
did not specifically analyze his extreme emotion disturbance 
claim. Instead, the court merely stated that Johnson received 
a sentence less severe than he could have received had he 
gone to trial. While the potential sentence facing a defendant 
is relevant, it is not the sole factor and must be balanced 
with other considerations relevant to a defendant's decision 
whether to go to trial or plead guilty. As the court stated in 
Hill v. Lockhart,45 "where he [the defendant] alleged error 
of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential 
affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of 
the 'prejudice' inquiry will depend largely on whether the 
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial." 
Johnson has alleged sufficient facts to support an 
extreme emotional disturbance defense. Johnson and Deputy 
Hutchison were the only witnesses to the incident Although 
the Commonwealth indicated it would call a medical expert 
and the investigative officer as witnesses at trial, the exact 
content of their testimony is not revealed. The current record 
contains insufficient information to evaluate the viability 
of an extreme emotional disturbance defense. Additionally, 
Johnson would have been subject to a maximum sentence 
of ten years on a conviction for either Assault I or Assault 
II under Extreme Emotional Disturbance as enhanced by the 
PFO II, which is less than the thilieen years he received 
under the guilty plea. As a result, we cannot say the record 
clearly refutes Johnson's claim of actual prejudice provided 
he was not advised or aware of an extreme emotional 
disturbance defense. Consequently, an evidentiary hearing 
is necessary to provide further information on counsel's 
performance, i.e., whether he discussed a potential extreme 
emotional disturbance defense with Johnson and counsel's 
handling of this issue, and any actual prejudice should defense 
counsel's performance be deemed deficient. The circuit 
court's order denying Johnson's RCr 11.42 motion must be 
vacated with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel conceming a potential extreme emotional disturbance 
defense, and this case must be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing on and reconsideration by the eourt of that issue. 
The order denying Johnson' RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed in 
part and vacated in part, and this case is remanded to Jefferson 
Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opmion, 
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